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S054868
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
KHALID IQBAL KHAWAR
Plaintiff and Respondent
V.
GLOBE INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Defendant and Petitioner,
)
)
) Court of Appeal,
) Second District 
) 2 Civil No, B084899
)
) Los Angeles County 
) Superior Court No. WEC 139685 
)
PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary Statement
On August 31, 1989 Khalid Iqbal Khawar (Respondent) filed 
suit in Los Angeles Superior Court against Globe International, 
Inc. (Globe) and Ronald Morrow (Morrow), among others. (A.C.T. 
137.)^ In his suit, Respondent alleged that in reporting about a 
book by Morrow on the assassination of Robert Kennedy, Globe had 
re-published libelous, defamatory statements about him, damaging 
his name and reputation and causing him harm. (A.C.T. 139.) 
After a trial, a jury returned a special verdict for Respondent 
on April 15, 1994, awarding him $675,000 in compensatory damages,
^ A.C.T. abbreviates Augmented Clerk's Trauiscript, C.T. 
abbreviates Clerk's Transcript, R.T. abbreviates Reporter's 
Transcript.
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and $500,000 in punitive damages. (A.C.T. 2783, 2791.) The 
punitive damage award resulted from the jury's finding that 
c’lobe's conduct had been negligent and with actual malice.
(A.C.T. 2791.)
At the beginning of the trial, a default judgment had been 
entered against Morrow, since he failed to make an appearance. 
During the jury trial, the judge made a determination that 
Globe's conduct had rendered it the original purveyor of libel. 
The default judgment against Morrow was thus vacated, leaving 
Globe as the only remaining defendant responsible for paying the 
judgment. See Khawar v. Globe Int'l, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92, 98 
(1996). In a special verdict, the jury found, inter alia, that 
the Globe article was an accurate and neutral report of Morrow's 
book. See id. However, the trial judge disagreed with the 
jury's finding and a decision was entered for Respondent. 
id.
Globe appealed the judgment of the trial court. On June 5, 
1996, Justice Gold, assigned to the Second District of the 
California Court of Appeal affirmed the decision below. id^
at 99. The Court of Appeal's opinion reached a number of issues 
of law, including Respondent's status as a public or private 
figure and whether Globe acted with malice. See The Court
of Appeal did not reach the question of whether California had 
adopted the neutral reportage privilege. id^ at 98. On June
2
21, 1996, the Court of Appeal denied Globe's petition for re­
hearing. See id. at 92.
On September 25, 1996, this Court granted Globe's petition 
for review. See Khawar v. Globe Int'l. 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277 
(1996).
Statement of Facts
Khawar is a professional photographer, of Pakistani descent, 
who has been in the United States for many years. (R.T. 1330- 
36.) On June 4, 1968, he was photographing a speech by Senator 
Kennedy at the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles. (R.T. 1388.) 
During the event, Respondent stood on the stage very near the 
Senator while apparently documenting the event. (R.T. 1339.)
Upon leaving the hotel. Senator Kennedy was shot and killed while 
passing through the kitchen. (R.T. 1341.) Sirhan Sirhan, a 
Jordanian student, was tried and convicted for the assassination 
of Senator Kennedy. (A.C.T. 143-44.)
After the assassination, Respondent remained at the scene, 
taking pictures of other victims. (R.T. 1341.) Respondent also 
attempted to enter the kitchen pantry area which was blocked by 
that time. Id. Respondent attempted to sell those pictures to 
Life magazine. (R.T. 1394.) There is no evidence Respondent was 
present in the kitchen where the assassination took place. (R.T. 
702 . )
In November, 1988, Robert Morrow wrote and published a book 
entitled "The Senator Must Die." (A.C.T. 140.) In this book.
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Morrow put forth a theory that the Senator was not killed by 
Sirhan Sirhan, but by a group of Iranian secret police, acting on 
behalf of the Mafia in the United States. (C.T. 3145.) The book 
contained photographs and statements indicating Respondent was a 
participant in the assassination of the Senator.
Morrow's book contained photos taken at the hotel the night 
of the assassination, one of which was reproduced in the Globe 
article. (R.T. 1357.) This photo depicted Respondent with an 
arrow pointed at his head. (R.T. 1359.) Respondent was 
identified in the book and Globe article as Ali Ahmand. Id•
The April 4, 1989 issue of The Globe magazine contained a 
brief report on Mr. Morrow's book, the photo of Respondent, and 
its allegations regarding the assassination of Senator Kennedy.
(A.C.T. 139.) Respondent became aware of the Globe article 
through a former employee. (R.T. 1357.)
John Blackburn, the author of the article reportedly read 
Morrow's entire book, conducted an interview with the author, and 
attempted to contact the subject of Morrow's book. (R.T. 1092- 
93, 1121.) The attempt to contact the subject of Morrow's book 
consisted of Blackburn calling Los Angeles Directory Assistance 
and asking for a listing for Ali Ahmand. (R.T. 1120-21.)
Pursuant to a Pakistani custom. Respondent would at times go 
by his first two names, Khalid Iqbal, and at times use all three 
names, Khalid Iqbal Khawar. (R.T. 1383.) One Kennedy campaign 
worker said Respondent introduced himself as Ali Ahmad the night
4
of the Indiana primary. Id. Ali Ahmad was Respondent’s father's 
name.
Respondent claims he suffered permanent and irreparable harm 
from the publication. (A.C.T. 140.) Respondent testified that 
his house was egged and his son's car was vandalized. (R.T. 
1367.) Respondent claims to have received between 10 and 40 
threatening calls between the time the Globe article was 
published and the filing of the lawsuit. (R.T. 1415.)
The assassination of Senator Kennedy took place in the early 
morning hours of June 4, 1968. (R.T. 1338.) Respondent left the
United States for Pakistan in November of 1968. (R.T. 1351.)
Respondent returned to the United States May 7, 1971. (R.T.
1353.) In 1977 Respondent moved to Bakersfield where he 
currently resides. (R.T. 1355.)
Respondent kept a picture of himself and Senator Kennedy, 
taken the night of the assassination. (R.T. 1357.) Respondent's 
picture was similar to that published by Globe. Id. Respondent 
hung the picture on the wall of his Bakersfield office and 
estimated that thousands of employees saw it there. (R.T. 1358- 
359.) Respondent also kept a Time magazine with his picture on 
the cover, depicting the assassination scene. (R.T. 1392.)
About four months after the publication of Globe's report, 
and less than a year after Morrow's book came out, Respondent 
filed suit against Morrow, Roundtable Publishing (the publisher 
of the book), and Globe. (A.C.T. 137-41.)
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Is an individual a limited-purpose public figure when he 
voluntarily‘involved himself in a nationally televised event 
and later took affirmative steps to influence public 
opinion?
2. May Globe invoke the neutral reportage privilege as a 
complete or partial defense to Respondent's libel claim?
3. Can Respondent be awarded punitive damages without clear and 
convincing evidence of actual malice?
6
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondent is a limited-purpose public figure in the 
controversy surrounding the assassination of Senator Kennedy. 
Under normal circumstances a farmer from Bakersfield, California 
would not be considered any sort of public figure. However 
unique facts in this case contribute to Respondent's rare status.
Respondent voluntarily thrust himself into the center of 
events the night Senator Kennedy was assassinated. He positioned 
himself on the podium, a central location in a nationally 
televised event. Respondent was not present in the pantry during 
the assassination, but tried unsuccessfully to push his way into 
the area, taking pictures of other victims which he later tried 
to sell. Finally, Respondent gave a television interview after 
filing suit against Globe, attempting to draw on his status to 
influence public opinion. Respondent benefitted from his 
orchestrated presence and close proximity to the assassination.
Regardless of Respondent's status, the neutral reportage 
privilege should apply in this case, providing a complete defense 
for Globe. Persuasive authority and sound public policy support 
the adoption of the privilege. The privilege is an important 
expression of the First Amendment. A reporter should not be 
denied the right to disseminate important information simply 
because somebody else reported it first.
The privilege adopted by this Court should apply broadly to 
public and private figures. It should not be limited to reports
7
on newsworthy subjects, because a defamatory report is newsworthy 
in itself. Nor should the privilege be limited to re­
publications of material from trustworthy sources. Such a 
requirement impossibly burdens re-publishers and has significant 
potential to severely chill the dissemination of information.
Any decision by this Court carries substantial implications 
for public policy. Neutral reportage encourages authors of 
■original works to take more care by clarifying the fact that they 
will be fully liable for damages caused by their works and by re- 
publications thereof. Most importantly, the privilege supports 
the basic goals of the First Amendment by encouraging the widest 
possible dissemination of important information for public 
consumption and judgment. Globe strongly urges this Court to 
adopt the privilege and thereby enhance and protect the First 
Amendment rights of all Californians.
Finally, under no circumstances should the Court award 
Respondent punitive damages. Clear and convincing evidence does 
not exist to support the finding that Globe acted with a reckless 
disregard for the truth, or knowledge that the article was false. 
Therefore, actual malice, which is required for punitive damages 
cannot be shown. Globe maintained journalistic standards by 
using disclaimers. Moreover, a failure to investigate is 
insufficient to support a charge of actual malice.
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ARGUMENT
I. RESPONDENT IS A LIMITED-PURPOSE PUBLIC FIGURE BECAUSE HE
THRUST HIMSELF TO THE FOREFRONT OF A PUBLIC CONTROVERSY AND
LATER ATTEMPTED TO AFFECT ITS OUTCOME.
A. The Public Versus Private Figure Question Calls For
De Novo Review.
New York Times v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964), 
declared that appellate courts must independently examine the 
entire record, including statements at issue and the context in 
which those statements were made, in order to ensure libel 
judgements do not run afoul of constitutional principles. See 
also McCoy v. Hearst, 42 Cal. 3d 835, 841 (1986).
Respondent is a limited-purpose public figure. This 
determination is founded on voluntary acts Respondent undertook 
to influence events surrounding a public controversy. This issue 
is a question of law and fact, and thus a preliminary 
determination to be made by a judge. See Stolz v. KSFM 102 FM.
30 Cal. App. 4th 195, 203-04 (1994).
B. Finding .Re.$pondent To Be A Private Figure Would Set A
Dangerous Precedent.
Respondent’s status is crucial to this case since it 
determines whether negligence, or the higher standard of actual 
malice is necessary for a compensatory damage award.
Furthermore, Respondent's status determination has a direct 
effect on the right to free speech. The First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution serves to protect the vigorous debate 
of public issues. Respondent in this case undertook voluntary
9
acts related to a public controversy. Free speech needs 
breathing space to flourish, 2uid finding Respondent to be a 
private figure would encroach on this space, diminishing First 
Amendment protections. See New York Times. 376 U.S. at 272.
Respondent was involved in a very public controversy, took 
affirmative steps to thrust himself into the center of that 
controversy, and later tried to influence the outcome of issues 
related to that controversy. Thus, finding Respondent to be 
anything but a limited-purpose or involuntary public figure would 
cause publishers to steer clear of the unlawful zone to avoid any 
type of costly litigation, not just unfavorable judgements, See
generally Gertz v. Robert Welch,_Inc.. 418 U.S. 323, 367-68
(1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
C. A Totality Of The Circumstances Test Indicates
Is A Limited-Purpose Public Figure.
A review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding a 
controversy is required to determine whether an individual is a 
public figure, limited-purpose public figure, involuntary public 
figure, or private figure. See Reader's Digest Ass'n v,—Superior 
Court. 37 Cal. 3d 244, 255 (1984).
The unique circumstances of this case warrant Respondent s 
designation as a limited-purpose public figure. Respondent was 
involved in the assassination of a United States Senator. This 
is an event that affected millions, shaped history, and continues 
to affect new generations.
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Respondent is not accused of participating in the 
assassination for purposes of this litigation. However, 
Respondent did everything in his power to position himself in a 
central location the night of the assassination. After the 
assassination, Respondent remained at the scene, took pictures of 
other victims and attempted to enter the kitchen area where the 
Senator was shot. Respondent later attempted to sell those 
pictures. Following the assassination, he was invited to meet 
with the President of Pakistan, because he was "very prominent" 
and doing well in the United States. (R.T. 1412:9-13.)
Respondent became a limited-purpose public figure by virtue 
of his voluntary actions on the night of the controversy and 
thereafter. This is true regardless of whether Respondent 
intended to achieve such status. "When an individual undertakes 
a course of conduct that invites attention, even though such 
attention is neither sought nor desired, he may be deemed a 
public figure." McDowell v. Paiewonskv. 769 F.2d 942, 949 (3d 
Cir. 1985). In Marcone v. Penthouse Int ’ 1 Magazine For Men. 754 
F.2d 1072, 1086 (3d Cir. 1985), an attorney was deemed a limited- 
purpose public figure for his association with bikers indicted 
for illegal drug activity. The court stated that actions of 
plaintiffs were looked at as well as intentions, with a course of 
conduct bound to attract attention being sufficient for public 
figure status. See id. This is also true of Respondent whose
11
actions thrust him so far into a controversy he could have been a 
witness in the criminal prosecution.
1. Gertz V. Robert Welch. Inc, provides the three
original categories of public fiaure^s.
In Gertz. the Supreme Court described three categories of 
public figures. 418 U.S. at 342-45. A general public figure has 
reached a level of fame or notoriety which would make them a 
public figure in any instance. See id. at 342. A limited- 
purpose public figure is generally one who has attained a status 
or assumed a role of prominence in society, usually thrusting 
themself into a public controversy in an effort to influence 
events. See id. at 345. The third class of public figure, an 
involuntary public figure, could become a public figure through 
no purposeful actions of their own. See id. In all three cases, 
these figures "invite attention and comment." Id.
2. California courts look to the plaintiff's 
affirmative actions to determine plaintiff_Ls 
status.
This Court in Reader's Digest Ass*n declared that an 
individual is not a public figure merely because that person is 
involved in a newsworthy controversy. 37 Cal, 3d at 254.
Instead, a public figure must have undertaken voluntary acts to 
influence the resolution of the controversy in question. See id.
In Reader's Digest Ass'n, a foundation established as a drug 
rehabilitation center, Synanon Church, filed a defamation action 
against a magazine which claimed Synanon made minimal attempts to
12
rehabilitate drug addicts, yet still solicited funds for that 
purpose. Id. at 249-50. This Court held that Synanon was a 
public figure, not because of a particular controversy, but 
because of its repeated attempts to interject itself into the 
public arena. See id. at 255.
In Rudnick v. McMillan. 25 Cal. App. 4th 1183, 1190 (1994), 
a rancher was held to be a limited-purpose public figure because 
he encouraged a publisher to write about a public controversy.
In Rudnick. a controversy arose over who was responsible for 
degradation of a ranch, Rudnick or the Nature Conservatory. Id. 
at 1186-90. Rudnick talked to a publisher in an attempt to 
defend himself and gain public favor, as did Respondent here.
This case demonstrates that Respondent's affirmative actions are 
sufficient for limited-purpose public figure status.
These cases are important because they indicate that 
affirmative actions are enough for public figure status. These 
cases also demonstrate that circ\imstances of individual cases can 
lead courts outside of the Gertz model.
3. Lower federal courts have found it necessary to
deviate from the classic Gertz model to account
for unique facts.
In Brewer v. Memphis Publ'a Co.. 626 F.2d 1238, 1257 (5th 
Cir. 1980), the court stated Plaintiff's status was difficult to 
classify, thus requiring a resolution outside of the traditional 
Gertz model.
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Brewer was a singer and actress associated at one time with 
Elvis Presley. Ssg at 1240. Years later she brought suit
against a newspaper which published that she and Presley had a 
reunion. Ses iiL. The court held that Brewer was a public figure 
due to her own career and her association with Presley. 
at 1257. Alone, Brewer had only a modest stature as an 
entertainer, with any career notoriety being of a local nature. 
See id. at 1248.
Brewer did not fit into the traditional Gertz model since 
she was "not tied to a particular controversy." Id^ at 1257. 
However, the court declared that the Gertz categories were not 
exclusive, but rather examples of cases where plaintiffs invited 
"attention and comment." Id... at 1254 (quoting gertz, 418 U.S. at 
345) .
Although Brewer is persuasive authority, it should be 
considered in the resolution of the present case due to similar 
circumstances. Both Brewer and Respondent were lesser known 
individuals associated with a very famous individual. Although 
Brewer may have had more of an association with Presley, 
Respondent's brief association with Senator Kennedy was far more 
controversial. If Brewer's mere association with Presley was 
enough to make her a limited-purpose public figure for articles 
concerning that association. Respondent’s association with the 
Senator on the night of the assassination should likewise make 
him a limited-purpose public figure.
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In Street v. National Broad. Co.. 645 F.2d 1227, 1229-30
(6th Cir. 1981), Victoria Street was the prosecutrix and 
principal witness in a controversial rape trial involving racial 
overtones. Forty years later she brought suit against a 
broadcasting company that portrayed her in a negative light. See 
id. Street was held to be a public figure even though her status 
as a rape victim could not be voluntary. See id. at 1234. The 
court supported its holding by citing Street's access to channels 
of communication in the past and present. See id. at 1234-36.
Here, Respondent may not have chosen to be a limited-purpose 
public figure, but became one by the nature of his presence and 
actions on the night in question. Also, the nature of the 
controversy and of Morrow's accusations provided Respondent with 
access to channels of communication which he voluntarily used to 
his advantage.
4. Passage of time is not an issue.
Passage of time was not an issue in Brewer or Street and 
should not be one in the present case. Brewer stated that 
passage of time was not a problem with respect to articles 
discussing her association with Presley since his career and 
persona were still "phenomenal." 626 F.2d at 1257. The same is 
true about Senator Kennedy and this particular controversy since 
videos and photographs of that night are still displayed every 
anniversary of the assassination.
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In .qtreet. the court said passage of time does not "diminish 
the significance of events or the public’s need for information." 
645 F.2d at 1236. The court noted that Street still possessed 
access to channels of communication and said, "once a person 
becomes a public figure in connection with a public controversy, 
that person remains a public figure thereafter for purposes of 
later commentary or treatment of that controversy." Id^ at 1235- 
36. This is particularly relevant here since time has not 
diminished the significance of Senator Kennedy's assassination 
and Respondent has had access to communication channels since the 
controversy originated. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has 
inferred in dicta that the passage of time has never been an 
issue in defamation suits. Partington v. Bualiosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 
1152 n.8 (9th Cir. 1995) .
D. Respondent's Placement Of Himself On The Podium And
Actions Immediately Following The Assassination
Constitute Voluntary Acts To Thrust Himself Tg The
Forefront Of A Controversy.
It is settled law that voluntary acts are required to attain 
limited-purpose public figure status. See Reader' s—Digest Ass—n, 
37 Cal. 3d at 254. The United States Supreme Court has generally 
ruled on what is insufficient for a voluntary act. e_^,
Wolston V- Reader’s Digest Ass’Jl, 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (holding 
plaintiff could not be a public figure solely because he was a 
criminal defendant); Time. Inc, v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) 
(holding plaintiff was not public figure merely by being involved
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in a newsworthy event, a private divorce); Gertz. 418 U.S. at 323 
(holding plaintiff attorney was not a public figure by 
associating himself with a case sure to receive media exposure, 
yet he never personally talked to the press).
Respondent went beyond the acts described in the above 
cases. Respondent benefitted from his place on the podium, a 
place he actively sought where media exposure was more than 
foreseeable. After the assassination, Respondent did not move 
out of the way, but tried to enter the pantry, further involving 
himself in an obviously newsworthy event. As a result.
Respondent is a limited-purpose public figure due to his 
involvement in the assassination, culminating in his contact with 
the media.
E. Respondent’s Press Interview Constituted A Direct
Attempt To Influence Public Opinion In A Public
In Denney v. E.^M. Lawrence. 22 Cal. App. 4th 927, 930 
(1994), Roger Denney's identical twin brother, Rodney, killed his 
wife and was convicted of manslaughter. The media intensely 
covered the crime. See id. at 931. Roger Denney sued Lawrence 
for writing a letter to a newspaper, later printed, which 
erroneously named him as the murderer. See id. at 932.
The court held Denney was a limited-purpose public figure 
because he gave press interviews, promoted a version of the case 
favorable to his brother, and spoke to the press at a time when 
his brother would not, thus making his information particularly
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relevant and influential. See id. at 935-36. According to the 
court, giving press interviews could not be considered anything 
but voluntary since no one forced Denney to talk to the press.
See id. at 935. Denney was a limited-purpose public figure 
because he "thrust himself into the limelight and initiated 
public debate on an issue of obvious public interest," Id. at 
936.
Like Denney, Respondent voluntarily gave a press interview. 
No one forced Respondent to go on a television program and give 
his side of a story in an attempt to influence public opinion.
The principles of Penney must be applied in this case to prevent 
an individual who uses his access to the media for his own 
benefit from later hiding behind his private figure status. An 
individual who voluntarily seeks out the media assumes the risk 
of public scrutiny. Although Denney gave more interviews than 
Respondent, the distinction is unimportant in light of 
Respondent's clear voluntary attempt to influence public opinion. 
See id.
F. The Opinion Below Failed To Take Into Account Relevant
Factors.
The opinion below did not look at all of Respondent's 
actions, or consider the unique nature of this case. The court 
said Respondent's '‘affirmative actions, namely, attendance at the 
Kennedy campaign rally and appearance on the podium near Senator 
Kennedy, do not rise to the level of action by which the
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purported public figure thrust himself into the forefront of a 
public controversy." Khawar. 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101. This 
statement does not take into account Respondent's actions after 
the fact, or his media appearance. The opinion below also 
erroneously indicated that passage of time would affect 
Respondent’s status, contrary to case law.
G. If Not A Limited-Purpose Public Figure. Respondent Is
An Involuntary Public Figure.
In Dameron v. Washington Magazine. 779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 
1985), Dameron was held to be an involuntary public figure. He 
filed a defamation suit against a magazine that claimed air 
traffic controllers were partially responsible for a crash that 
killed 92 people. See id. at 738. He was the only air traffic 
controller on duty at the time of the crash. See id.
Aspects of Dameron are very similar to this case. The 
accusations were similar in magnitude, Dameron accused of being 
partly responsible for 92 deaths, Respondent accused of being 
partly responsible for the death of a well-loved and well-known 
American leader. Both articles were based on only one source. 
See id.; (R.T. 1092-93.) Both articles failed to mention the 
plaintiff's name. See id. at 742; (C.T. 3145.)
The Dameron court distinguished Firestone as a divorce 
proceeding thus being inherently private, even if the public was 
interested. Id. By contrast, Dameron was involved in a public 
controversy from the very beginning {public safety) , as was
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Respondent. Sgg (R.T. 1341-42.) Like p^^rgn. Respondent's
case is one that is exceedingly rare due to the extreme nature of 
the public controversy. Through his in-depth involvement in such 
a great controversy/ Respondent undeniably became at least an 
involuntary public figure.
II. PETITIONER URGES THIS COURT TO ADOPT THE NEUTRAL REPORTAGE 
PRIVILEGE.
A. De Novo Review Is The Appropriate Standard.
Globe urges this Court to adopt the "neutral reportage" 
privilege that has been adopted in other jurisdictions. 
e.g.. Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'v. Inc.. 556 F.2d 113 (2d 
Cir. 1977); Barrv v. Time. Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Cal. 
1984); Ward v. News Group Int'l. 733 F. Supp. 83 (C.D. Cal.
1990). In the opinion below the Court of Appeal, despite lengthy 
discussion of the fact that California has not adopted the 
privilege, explicitly did not reach this issue. Khawar, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 98.
As a question of first impression concerning the adoption of 
a general legal principle for California, this is a pure question 
of law. "[T]he question . . . requires an 'exercise [of]
judgment about the values that animate legal principles;' hence 
that question is one of law which we review de novo." Smith v. 
University of Cal. Reaentg, 56 Cal. App. 4th 979, 984 (1997) 
(quoting Ghirardo v. Antonioli. 8 Cal. 4th 791, 800-01 (1994)). 
Therefore, the privilege issue requires de novo review.
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B. Persuasive Authority Supports Adoption Of The 
Privilege.
"In one of the few instances where folk wisdom has been 
directly enshrined in the common law, the apothegm '[t]alebearers 
are as bad as talemakers' appears as the rule '[o]ne who re­
publishes a libel adopts it as his own.'* James E. Boasberg,
With Malice Toward None: A New Look at Defamatory Re-publication
And Neutral Reportage. 13 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 455, 456 
(1991) . While perhaps wise in some instances, this paradigm has 
for many years proven troublesome for courts and legal 
commentators. The solution to this important constitutional 
problem is found in the neutral reportage privilege.
1. The original, narrow Edwards privilege is a basis
from which this Court mav begin in drawing
California's privilege.
The privilege finds its original legal footing in the Second 
Circuit's opinion in Edwards. 556 F.2d at 113. The Edwards court 
adopted the privilege with some important limitations. Id. at 
119-20. Edwards required that the charges reported upon be made 
by a "responsible, prominent organization," be made against a 
public figure, and be about a newsworthy event. Id. The re­
publication itself was required to be accurate, neutral and 
disinterested. See id. Other jurisdictions that have adopted 
the privilege have modified or eliminated some requirements.
See, e.g.. Barrv, 584 F. Supp. at 1110 (applying privilege to 
limited-purpose public figure party to controversy, eliminating
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itrustworthy source requirement); Ward. 733 F. Supp. at 83 
(applying privilege to limited-purpose public figure generally); 
April V. Reflector-Herald. 46 Ohio App. 3d 95, 98 (1988)
(applying privilege to private figure party to public 
controversy).
2. Even the narrowest reading of the privilege does
not recTuire that the re-publisher believe in the
truth of the original report, nor that re- 
publications literally .repeat the original-
The Edwards court held that the First Amendment forbade 
requiring the press to suppress reporting of newsworthy 
statements simply because somebody else had reported them first. 
Id. at 120. The court held further that the secondary reporter 
need not have great confidence nor undertake great investigation 
into the validity or truth of the matters asserted.
"[T]he First Amendment protects the accurate and disinterested 
reporting of those charges, regardless of the reporter's private 
views regarding their validity." Id^ Thus, even if the 
secondary reporter has serious personal doubts about the truth of 
the original report, he is constitutionally protected if he 
believes that his re-report is accurate and neutral.
The Edwards court also held that "literal accuracy is not a 
prerequisite." Id. The secondary reporter simply must believe 
in good faith that his report accurately represents the original 
publication. See id. Strict requirements on the secondary 
reporter to ascertain the truth or accuracy of the original
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report only serve to chill the dissemination of information. 
Moreover, such requirements do not make proportional strides 
toward protecting the reputations of those reported upon.
3. Recent precedent supports aPDlyina the privilege
tQ^limited-Durposejpublic and private figures.
The privilege should apply to non-public figures as well as 
public figures. The Edwards court did not address reports about 
non-public figures, and thus its holding has been narrowly 
interpreted. See id. at 120. Later courts, including the 
Federal District Courts for the Northern and Central Districts of 
California, have explicitly broadened the Edwards privilege by 
applying it to reports about limited-purpose public figures. See 
Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1110; Ward. 733 F. Supp. at 83.
In Barry. the court applied the privilege to statements 
about a basketball coach made by a former player and re-reported 
in a national magazine. Id. at 1112. The court reasoned that 
the public has the right to know about and make informed 
judgments about controversial issues which are of general 
interest. See id. at 1125.
The Barry court considered the coach a limited-purpose 
public figure. Id. at 1118. However, the court stated in dicta 
that "the rationale justifying the . . . privilege may apply 
equally to [private] plaintiffs." Id. at 1127. Furthermore, the 
Barry court expressed doubt about the common interpretation that 
the Edwards privilege applied only to public figures. See id.
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”It has never been entirely clear . . . whether the [Edwards] 
privilege would apply if the subject of the defamation were a 
private individual." Id. at 1127 n.20.
The limited-purpose public figure in Barrv is rather similar 
to Respondent. Moreover, the issues in both cases are 
controversial and of general interest. Therefore, it is 
appropriate for this Court to follow Barrv and apply the 
privilege here. However, should the Court find that Respondent 
is a private figure, application of the privilege is not 
foreclosed.
The Ohio Court of Appeal has explicitly applied the 
privilege to a private figure. See April, 46 Ohio App. 3d at 98. 
The court saw "no legitimate difference between the press's 
accurate reporting of accusations made against a private figure 
and those made against a public figure, when the accusations 
themselves are newsworthy and concern a matter of public 
interest." Id.
Similarly, the Court here should construe the privilege 
broadly to protect re-publication of reports about private as 
well as public figures. If the re-publication is accurate and 
neutral, then the privilege should apply. Limiting it to reports 
about public figures limits dissemination of information, 
contrary to the fundamental tenets of the First Amendment. The 
knowledge that a reputable and possibly prominent individual or 
organization has attacked the character of a private individual
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is critical to allow the public to gain insight into the methods 
and character of that author or organization. Such an attack may 
be more newsworthy than a story about a public figure. The 
privilege should apply to private and public figures alike.
4. The privilege should not constrict First Amendment
freedom bv reouirina re-puhlishers to ascertain a
source*s trustworthiness before it is applicable.
The Barry court wrote forcefully against requiring the 
original reporter to be trustworthy for the privilege to apply. 
584 F. Supp. at 1126. The court felt that the First Amendment 
requires the public to be the "arbiters of how 'trustworthy' a 
source is," because forcing that duty on a re-publisher is likely 
to have a chilling effect. Id. "A much more sensible approach 
is to extend the [privilege] to all re-publications of serious 
charges . . . regardless of the 'trustworthiness' of the original 
defamer." Id.
Globe urges this Court to follow the Barry court's lead in 
cleansing the privilege of this unnecessary and unwise 
requirement. The trustworthiness requirement places onerous, 
unfair, and perhaps impossible burdens of time, cost and 
feasibility on the re-publisher. "[E]ven if [a secondary 
reporter] does not fear ultimate liability, the mere threat of 
costly and time-consuming inquiry into his state of mind may cast 
a chilling effect on publication." Id. at 1125. Moreover, 
trustworthiness is inherently a subjective quality, the 
determination of which should be left to the public. See id. at
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5. Inter-iurisdictional consistency and.recent
judicial, trends support adoption of the pri.yil^q^.
Consistency of legal doctrines across various forums is of 
great value to litigants. Inter-jurisdictional consistency is 
particularly important for news publications where editorial 
decisions having significant legal ramifications must be made 
quickly. Fear of libel resulting from uncertainty about the law 
results in self-censorship, opposite the goals of the First 
Amendment. Currently the neutral reportage landscape is uneven. 
Two of four federal district courts in California have adopted 
the privilege, while the state courts, of course, have not.^
Thus, improving consistency across jurisdictions provides yet 
another solid reason for this Court to adopt the privilege.
A growing range of persuasive authority supports adoption 
and/or application of the privilege.
1126-27. Elimination of this requirement allows for wider
dissemination of information, in furtherance of the purposes of
the First Amendment. The trustworthiness requirement does not
belong in California's neutral reportage privilege.
^ The United States Supreme Court has not decided this issue. In 
Harte-Hanks Communications. Inc.. v^Connaughton. 491 U.S. 657, 660, 
694 (1989) (BlacJonun, J., concurring), the Court, noting previous 
adoption of the privilege by numerous other courts, alluded to a 
desire to address the issue and perhaps to adopt the privilege, at 
least with respect to public figures. However, because the defendant 
did not raise the privilege as a defense, the Court sidestepped the 
issue. See id. The fact that the Supreme Court did not speak out 
against the privilege, and was at a minimum neutral to its potential 
adoption, should provide further support for this Court in adopting 
the privilege for California.
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In the last few years . . . courts have . . . 
recognized the defense, either through an express 
adoption of it or through a positive consideration of 
it in dicta. Many courts, too, have broadened the 
privilege far beyond the contours created by a narrow 
reading of the Edwards decision. These courts . . . 
have read the Edwards decision as a broad protection of 
. . . the [F]irst [A]mendment.
Scott E. Saef, Neutral Reportage: The Case For..a Statutory
pt-tvileae. 86 Nw. U.L. Rev. 417, 419-20 (1992). Numerous federal
courts and approximately 20 state courts have adopted or applied
some form of the privilege since Edwards was decided in 1977.^’^
In summary, Globe urges this Court to follow this
significant body of persuasive authority and adopt a privilege
that is broadly applicable and protective of the First Amendment
rights of Californians.
^ See, e.q.. White v. Fraternal Order of Police. 909 F.2d 512,
528 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that although announcer used "dramatic 
intonations" privilege could still apply); Price v. Vikina-Penauin.
Inc. . 881 F.2d 1426, 1434 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding recitation of 
official action protected if accurate, even when results are clearly 
harmful); Medico v. .Time. Inc. . 643 F.2d 134, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(holding that consistency required application of existing state law 
privilege).
* See, e.q. . Gist v. Macon Coxintv Sheriff's Deot.. 284 Ill. App. 
3d 367, 379 (1996) (holding fair and accurate reports of government 
proceedings or activities of public figures protected, even if re­
publication lacked literal accuracy); Costello v. Ocean Countv 
observer. 136 N.J. 594, 626 (1994) (stating that "judges are ill 
equipped to act as city editors" thus publisher must be protected 
because of great public interest in receiving information); Herron v. 
Tribune. Publ'q Co.. Inc.. 108 Wash. 2d 162, 171 (1987) (applying 
privilege where re-publisher knows that original accusations are false 
and the accused has denied the allegations).
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D. Public Policy Supports Adoption Of Thg Parivileqe.
In addition to the precedential reasons noted above, there
are numerous policy considerations that compel this Court to 
adopt the privilege.
1. The privilege is necessary to further the ..Fira^ 
Amendment goal of the widest possibly
dissemination of information.
"The public interest in being fully informed about 
controversies that often rage around sensitive issues demands 
that the press be afforded the freedom to report such charges 
without assuming responsibility for them." Edwards, 556 F,2d at 
120. The free flow of information lies at the very heart of the 
First Amendment, and of the privilege. Failure to adopt the 
privilege restricts this flow, and in doing so diminishes the 
vitality of our society's discourse and debate about important 
issues. See id. Simply because a reporter may not be the 
original investigator of a story, or may even himself have doubts 
about it's validity, he should not be restricted by the fear of 
libel from accurately and neutrally re-reporting that 
information. See id.
Failure to adopt a broadly applicable privilege would result 
in a law that protects "mainstream" re-publishers, while denying 
those with narrower audiences and fewer resources the full 
protection of the First Amendment. This would reduce the 
diversity of information available for public consiimption and 
evaluation.
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The case at hand presents a clear example of this problem. 
Globe is not a mainstream news source, and the assassination of 
Robert Kennedy, while undoubtedly a major event in American 
history, may not generally be newsworthy today. However, this 
topic is extremely interesting to a segment of the population. 
Therefore, in that context, Morrow's book is entirely newsworthy. 
The fact that it may not be newsworthy in the broader context of 
society, should not mean that a report about it deserves any less 
constitutional protection, or should be any less widely 
disseminated than a report about the latest breaking stories of 
general interest.
Limiting the privilege to reports about public figures 
similarly denies a segment of the population the First 
Amendment's protections. An author or organization that 
irresponsibly publishes libelous statements about private figures 
should be exposed as such. That event is newsworthy in itself. 
See id.: see also Barry. 584 F. Supp. at 1127. The very private 
figure who is initially libeled is done a disservice if a narrow 
privilege results in his being denied a chance to have the libel 
that has been bestowed upon him identified as such. "A member of 
a civilized society should have some measure of protection 
against unwarranted attack upon his honor, his dignity and his 
standing in the community." Edwards. 556 F.2d at 122 (quoting T. 
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment at 69 
(Vintage 1967)).
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If the statements in Morrow's book are indeed libelous. 
Respondent should welcome Globe's accurate and neutral expose.
The more widely the book is reported on, the greater his 
opportunity to refute the statements made therein. The value of 
the privilege in supporting the fundamental purposes of the First 
Amendment is directly proportional to the freedom with which it 
is applied by this Court.
2. The privilege encourages responsible reporting
since a neutral re-publication is protected.
Adopting the privilege would encourage authors of original 
works to take more care in their reporting and investigation.
See generally Saef, Neutral Reportage: The Case For a Statutory 
Privilege. at 426. As it stands now, an irresponsible author 
whose defamatory work is re-published can pass on the financial 
liability to the re-publisher(s). Following adoption of the 
privilege, authors of original works would lose this perverted 
legal protection and thus be forced to take full responsibility 
for any defamatory remarks.
This idea works in proportion to the potential for damage t ^ 
the reputation of an individual or organization. The more widel;^ 
interesting or sensational the subject of an article, the more 
likely it is to be re-published. Under the current legal 
framework, the fact that the original libel is widely 
disseminated through re-publication means the original purveyor 
of the libelous statements is financially insulated. Following
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adoption of the privilege, the author of a highly defamatory 
article that attracts significant re-publication will be subject 
to great liability because he will have nobody with whom to share 
the burden of his bad deed. Defamation is most properly 
addressed and prevented at the original source.
The case at hand exemplifies this justification for the 
privilege. The suit against Morrow, the original author of the 
allegedly defamatory work, has been dismissed, and only the 
innocent re-publisher, Globe, remains potentially liable. The 
absence of a privilege has allowed the original author to publish 
what may be defamatory and damaging statements with impunity.
The privilege works to eliminate this injustice. The privilege 
serves both sides of the First Amendment balance; it protects the 
free dissemination of information and the reputations of innocent 
individuals.
E. Adoption Of The Privilege Provides Globe A Complete 
Defense To Respondent's Libel Claim.
The privilege provides a complete defense to Respondent's 
charges. The libel allegedly committed by Globe stems from its 
accurate and neutral re-publication of statements and allegations 
made in an original work by a reputable author. Thus, the Globe 
article is not libelous. Moreover, it repeatedly attributes the 
allegations reported upon to the original, reputable author, 
allowing any reader to properly identify the original source of 
the allegations.
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1. The Globe article was a neutral and accurate
report oi. Sorrow's book.
The Globe article was a neutral and accurate report of 
Morrow's original allegations. Of the 16 paragraphs in the 
article, 7 are direct quotations and 2 are for the sole purpose 
of attributing the information therein to Morrow. (C.T. 3145.) 
Perhaps more importantly, at trial the jury found in Question No. 
7 of the special verdict that the report was accurate and 
neutral. (A.C.T. 2782.) Although it was ultimately irrelevant 
to the decision, it is important to note that the original trier 
of fact who saw the evidence and heard the witnesses found that 
Globe's report was neutral and accurate. Although de novo review 
does not require deference to the factual determinations below, 
it does not mean that they must be completely ignored.
Despite the seemingly clear resolution of this point, the 
court below found that Globe's inclusion of a picture from 
Morrow's book and addition of a caption and an arrow pointing to 
Respondent rendered it the original purveyor of libel. Khawar.
54 Cal. Rptr. at 98 & n.l. The Edwards court warned that re­
publishers who "in fact espouse[] or concur[] in the charges made 
by others, or who deliberately distort[] these statements to 
launch a personal attack" may not avail themselves of the 
privilege. 556 F.2d at 120. Adding a caption and an arrow to a 
picture from the original work is far from espousing, concurring 
or distorting. These additions clarify the original report and
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avoid possible defamation of other people shown in the picture, 
who readers could mistake for Respondent. Moreover, the caption 
itself states that the allegations to which the picture pertains 
were made by "author Robert Morrow." (R.T. 3415.)
Determinations of the neutrality and accuracy of a re­
publication must be made in the context of the whole article.
See Ward. 733 F. Supp. at 83. "The [reviewing] [cjourt should 
consider the article as a whole and read the entire communication 
in context." Id. When taken in the context of the whole 
article, it is clear that the annotation and the caption do 
nothing to show that Globe supports or embraces Morrow's 
allegations. In fact, considering the article as a whole reveals 
further that Globe's additions were clarifications of materials 
set forth in the original publication, and that they actually 
protected others in the picture from potential defamation. In 
all respects, Globe's article was an accurate and neutral report 
of Morrow's book.
2. Should this Court decline to broaden the privilege
in the various ways discussed above, it still
serves as a defense to Respondent's allegations.
Even if this Court adopts a fairly restrictive privilege. 
Globe is protected. The trial court considered the neutral 
reportage defense and submitted instructions to the jury for a 
decision pertaining thereto. (C.T. 2832.) The privilege offered 
to the jury was very restrictive. To apply the privilege, the 
jury had to find that, in addition to the report being neutral
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and accurate, 1) Morrow was a responsible and prominent source,
2) the statements reported on were newsworthy, and 3) the 
reporter (Blackburn) believed reasonably and in good faith that 
his report accurately conveyed the statements made. (C.T. 2832.) 
The jury found that Globe's conduct met each of these 
requirements and thus the privilege should apply. The fact that 
Globe's report fit within this narrowly-defined privilege, and 
the fact that the court below was willing to go so far as to 
submit these instructions to the jury, weigh heavy in support of 
Globe's privilege defense.
As shown in Part I of this brief. Respondent is a limited- 
purpose public figure. However, the privilege should apply to 
reports about private figures as well. See, e.q., Barry, 584 F. 
Supp. at 1126; April. 46 Ohio App. 3d at 98. This approach best 
serves the First Amendment by allowing for the maximum 
dissemination of information about important events and 
controversies.
This limitation upon the privilege has met with severe 
criticism from commentators who note that under some 
circumstances the public may have a greater interest in 
knowing that a prominent organization or individual had 
made serious charges against a private individuaJ., 
since the making of such charges against a defenseless 
plaintiff gives the public relevant insight into the 
defamer's character.
Barry. 584 F. Supp. at 1127 (emphasis added). Thus, the status 
of Respondent should not be a factor in this Court's adoption or 
application of the privilege.
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III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES CAN NOT BE AWARDED WITHOUT CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE.
When the speech in question involves a matter of public 
concern. Respondent must prove actual malice to recover punitive 
damages.^ Brown v. Kelly JBroad^_Co.. 48 Cal. 3d 711, 747
(1989) (quoting Gertz. 418 U.S. at 347, 349). This is true 
regardless of whether he is a public or private figure. See id.
Constitutional malice requires a showing of subjective doubt 
on the part of the publisher. See Gertz. 418 U.S. at 349. In 
this case there is no evidence Globe entertained serious doubts. 
In fact, the publisher responded to the article by making the 
language stronger. This is evidence of belief and excitement 
rather than doubt. Further investigation would have been a sign 
of doubt.
Gertz held states were not permitted to allow recovery of 
punitive damages without a showing of actual malice for three 
reasons. Id. First, defamation is an oddity of tort law where 
compensatory damages are awarded without a showing of harm since 
it is assumed from the publication. See id. This means juries 
are unlimited in what they can award as compensatory damages and 
compounds the potential for inhibition of the vigorous exercise 
of the First Amendment. See id. Second, punitive damages are
^ Actual malice, also called New York Times malice or 
constitutional malice is: reckless disregard for the truth, or 
knowledge of falsity established when "the defendant in fact 
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." St. 
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
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dangerous because they provide the jury with an avenue for 
punishing unpopular publications rather than false facts. ^
This too, unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media 
self-censorship. Finally, states have no interest in
securing huge awards "far in excess of any actual injury." Id^
The rsertz Court was attempting "to reconcile state law with 
a competing interest grounded in the constitutional command of 
the First Amendment." Id. The Court stated "[i]t is necessary 
to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not prove knowledge of 
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for 
actual injury."
A. Punitive Damages Require De Novo Review.
"Contrary to the normal rule of appellate review, a
reviewing court must independently review all the evidence on the 
issue of malice." Kelly. 48 Cal. 3d at 747 (citing Bose Cgrp. v. 
rnnsumers Union of U.S.. Inc.. 466 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1984)).
This principle is based on the competing interests of protection 
of reputation and freedom of speech and was reaffirmed in Harte- 
Hanks Communications, 491 U.S. at 686.
B. There Is Insufficient Evidence To Affirm The Opinion 
Below On The Existence of Malice.
Respondent is required to prove malice by clear and 
convincing evidence, a higher standard than most civil actions, 
due to the importance of the constitutional protection. SB® New 
York Times. 376 U.S. at 285-86. Furthermore, in this
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constitutional area, jury verdicts are not persuasive because of 
the danger juries will decide an issue based on sympathy or 
distaste rather than constitutional principles. See Hearst. 42 
Cal. 3d at 844. Here, this standard has not been met.
Globe had a right to tell its readers about Morrow's theory. 
A conspiracy theory is unique in that it is difficult to prove. 
Globe could not even verify that Morrow once worked for the CIA 
since the CIA would never respond to such an inquiry. (R.T.
846.) Morrow is no longer party to this litigation, yet Globe is 
allegedly liable for merely reporting the existence of his theory 
to the public. Globe made every effort to distance itself from 
the truth or falsity of Morrow's theory. At trial. Respondent's 
expert cited Globe's use of the word "revealed" in its headline 
as irresponsible, yet he also admitted this could be attributed 
to a journalistic prerogative or style. (R.T. 865-68.) These 
are critical areas of First Amendment protection. These facts do 
not and cannot amount to actual malice.
The opinion below stated that Globe engaged in misconduct in 
which a reasonable person would not engage. See Khawar. 54 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 110. This comment implies negligence, not 
constitutional malice, which requires that the publisher 
entertained serious doubts about the veracity of a publication. 
The opinion below also states that Morrow's assertions are 
improbable on their face, providing circumstantial evidence that 
the re-publishers had doubts. This is a circular argument that
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provides no evidence of the re-publisher's subjective state of 
mind. Neither of these reasons provide clear and convincing 
evidence of malice.
C. Failure To Investigate Is Insufficient To Prove 
Actual Malice.
Malice is not established by showing speculative or sloppy 
reporting, a failure to contact the subject of a story for his or 
her side, or factual error alone. See Weinaarten v.—102 
Cal. App. 3d 129, 147 (1980). A failure to investigate fully 
could be a sign of negligence, but not a sign of knowledge of 
falsity or reckless disregard as required for actual malice.
A failure to investigate may reflect the subjective attitude 
of the publisher. See Reader's Digest Ass'n. 37 Cal. 3d at 258. 
However, any failure to investigate here was a direct response to 
Globe's perception that such research was unnecessary due to the 
use of disclaimers in the re-publication and the reputation of 
the original author. Globe's actions infer confidence in their 
article, not doubt.
Robert Morrow believed his source. The First Amendment is 
founded in the value of expressing and airing ideas that are a 
matter of public concern. Actual malice encourages open 
discussion by tolerating "silly arguments and strange ways of 
yoking facts together in unusual patterns.'* Street, 645 F.2d at 
1237. No one would suggest Respondent was risking his reputation 
by putting a picture of himself and Senator Kennedy on display in
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his semi-public office. However, the facts in this case are so 
unique that without Respondent's voluntary act he may never have 
been recognized. An award of punitive damages in this case would 
protect those who want to hide behind private figure status at 
the expense of the public's right to hear discussion on matters 
of public concern. This would be a dangerous encroachment on 
constitutional protections.
CONCLUSION
Respondent is a limited-purpose public figure. He 
voluntarily thrust himself into the center of controversial 
events. He used his presence at the assassination to elevate his 
status and later used a press interview to influence public 
opinion. Due to the unique facts of this case. Respondent is a 
limited-purpose public figure, although not of the typical Gertz 
model.
Regardless of Respondent's status. Globe should be protected 
by the neutral reportage privilege. Many courts have concluded 
that the privilege is an appropriate and responsible way to 
uphold and further the goals of the First Amendment. Numerous 
legal and public policy reasons compel this Court's adoption of 
the privilege. It would be a bold statement of law and policy, 
and a valuable safeguard for the First Amendment rights of 
Californians.
This case presents an excellent opportunity for the proper 
and just application of the privilege. Globe's report was
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accurate and neutral. The death of Senator Kennedy is a great 
public controversy. Morrow is a reputable author. Therefore, 
the privilege provides a complete defense to Respondent's claims.
Finally, the existence of actual malice is not supported by 
clear and convincing evidence as required for punitive damages. 
Such an award here would improperly hold protection of reputation 
above the constitutional command of free speech.
In light of the foregoing. Globe respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the Court of Appeal on the issues of 
Respondent's status, application of the neutral reportage 
privilege, and the propriety of punitive damages.
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